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INTRODUCTION 
During the survey period, November 1, 1997 to October 31, 1998, the 
Sixth Circuit considered an array of contract issues, spanning a gamut from 
intent to contract to time limits on actions for breach. While many opinions 
during this period include references to contract, sometimes brief or 
tangential, this survey addresses only those cases which, in the author's view, 
raise predominant or otherwise noteworthy contract issues, usually in the 
context of a traditional contract cause of action. 
Especially interesting are three opinions in which the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the statute of frauds barred enforcement of alleged oral 
agreements, demonstrating the continuing viability of this much-maligned 
doctrine. Also interesting is the Sixth Circuit's repeated invocation of the 
"plain-meaning rule" in several cases involving disputed contract terms. 
Noteworthy also is the court's reference to the "meeting of the minds" test of 
intent to contract, its relaxed distinction between contract and tort, and its 
restrictive definition of a requirements contract. 
10. 135 F.3d 1077 (6th Cir. 1998). 
11. 135 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 1998). 
12. 142 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 1998). 
13. 146 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998). 
14. 154 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 1998). 
15. 133 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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I. ENFORCEABILITY OF PROMISES 
A. Intention to be Bound 
Tschira v. Willingham '6 involved a sale of property in Tennessee to Klaus 
and Gerda Tschira, German residents. The seller, Corim, Inc., through its 
president, Willingham, had offered to obtain buildings in the southeastern 
United States for purchase at a "fair market price." Corim allegedly planned 
to realize a profit by subsequently leasing these properties from their new 
owners and then subleasing them to third parties at higher rental rates. In 
1990, the Tschiras agreed to buy from Corim a piece of property in Nashville, 
at a price of $1,985,000. The parties' agreement was evidenced by a letter 
from Willingham to the Tschiras. This letter, transcribed in German, and 
originally drafted by the Tschira' s tax advisor, characterized the nature of the 
parties' relationship '7 and specified that German law would govern. 18 
Several years later, the Tschiras discovered Corim and Willingham had 
purchased the Nashville property for $774,000, through a shell company, on 
the same day they sold it to the Tschiras, thus recognizing "an instant profit 
of$I,211,000.'"9 
The Tschiras consequently brought an action against Corim and 
Willingham, charging breach of fiduciary duty and intentional 
misrepresentation.20 Applying German law, the district court found a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties and so instructed the jury, which 
returned a verdict for the Tschiras.21 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Corim and Willingham initially argued 
that the district court improperly applied German law to the controversy. 
Willingham's letter was not a binding choice-of-Iaw agreement invoking 
German law, they urged, because Willingham had no intent to contract and the 
requisite '''meeting of the minds'" was therefore lacking.22 
The Sixth Circuit rejected Willingham's argument, quoting his trial 
testimony, which included the following statement: 
16. 135 F.3d 1077 (6th Cir. 1998). 
17. See id. at 1080-81. The interpretation of the German word used to define the 
parties' relationship was hotly disputed. See infra text accompanying notes 20-25. 
18. See id. 
19. [d. at 1081. 
20. Tschira, 135 F.3d at 1081. The misrepresentation claim alleged that Corim and 
Willingham fraudulently misrepresented the fair market value of the property and made false 
statements regarding coverage under title insurance and liability policies. Id. at 1087-88. 
21. See Tschira. 135 F.3d at 1082. 
22. Tschira. 135 F.3d at 1083. 
HeinOnline -- 1999 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 238 1999
238 Law Review [2:235 
[The Tschira's tax advisor] felt like the contract should be governed under Gennan 
law and that's my interpretation of the sentence that refers to the purchase agreement, 
which is to be concluded, will be subject to Gennan law. I saw nothing to our 
detriment in that. We fully intended to live up to the letter and spirit of that contract, 
and did.23 
Willingham's testimony, concluded the court, demonstrated his intent 
that the letter be binding and German law apply. Although the court cited 
Willingham's "meeting of the minds" test, it did not address the legitimacy of 
this test, which has been harshly criticized.24 
B. Policing the Agreement 
1. Misrepresentation, Fraud 
In Menuskin v. Williams,15 a development corporation ("DWCC")26 sold 
several properties which were encumbered by a construction lien, contrary to 
the sales contract and warranty deeds. Upon discovering the encumbrance, 
the purchasers sued DWCC, the title company (National Title) and its attorney 
(Sartain) who prepared the warranty deeds.27 Included among the purchasers' 
23. ld 
24. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTII, CONlRACfS § 3.6 (3d ed. 1999) (characterizing 
"meeting of the minds" as a much-abused metaphor and urging its abandonment). Criticism of 
"meeting of the minds" as a test of intent to contract stems fundamentally from its suggestion 
that intent depends on an actual (subjective) assent to be bound. As Judge Learned Hand 
explained in 1911: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent 
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force oflaw to certain 
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known 
intent. If, however it were proved by twenty bishops that either party when he used 
the words intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes on 
them, he would still be held, unless there were mutual mistake or something else of 
the sort. 
ld (quoting Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 201 F. 
664 (2d Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). As Holmes explained, "the making ofacontract 
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets 
of external signs - not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the 
same thing." FrigalimentImportingCo. v. B.N.S. Int'I Sales Corp., 190F.Supp. 116(S.D.N.Y. 
1960) (quoting THE PA TIl OF mE LAW, IN COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 178). 
25. 145 F.3d 755 (6th. Cir. 1998). 
26. See id. at 759. The corporation's full name was Don Williams Construction 
Company. 
27. See id. at 761. The purchasers' claims against Don Williams were previously 
settled. 
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claims were charges of breach of contract and breach of warranty. The district 
court entered summary judgment for all defendants on these two claims.28 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the purchasers argued that DWCC 
employees, National Title and Sartain were liable under Tennessee contract 
law for falsely representing that the title was unencumbered. The Sixth 
Circuit rejected this contract claim, finding no contractual relationship 
between the purchasers and defendants.. DWCC employees, the court 
reasoned, acted as known agents of DWCC and thus were not themselves 
contractually bound to the purchasers. As for National Title and Sartain, no 
evidence established an agreement between these defendants and the 
purchasers.29 
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the purchasers' claim that National Title 
and Sartain were liable for inducing a breach of the purchasers' contract with 
DWCC. In rejecting this third-party claim, the court explained that under 
Tennessee law a purchaser of real property who "has notice or with ordinary 
diligence should have had notice ofa problem with the real estate [cannot] 
attack the validity of the contract for fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment 
of that problem. ,,30 Since the purchasers here could have performed their own 
title search, the court reasoned, they could not complain.3) 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit added, the purchasers' requested remedy for 
third-party misrepresentation was inappropriate. The purchasers raised this 
claim not to attack the validity of the contract, but rather to impose liability 
on National Title and Sartain. The Sixth Circuit explained, however, that the 
contractual remedy for third-party misrepresentation is contract avoidance.32 
The court found no authority to support the purchasers' position that liability 
was appropriate because recission would not make them whole. The court 
advised the purchasers that while their requested remedy might be available 
in tort, it is not available in contract.33 
The purchasers' inappropriate request for a remedy on their third-party 
claim is one instance of a pervasive blending, in Menuskin, of elements of 
contract and tort. Indeed, the purchasers themselves explained that their 
claims for breach "are 'essentially the same as that made for the fraud and 
28. Id. 
29. See Menuskin. 145 F.3d at 769. 
30. Id. (quoting Winstead v. First Tennessee Bank N.A., Memphis, 709 S.W.2d 627, 
631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986». The Sixth Circuit found a genuine issue of material fact, however, 
as to National Title's and Sartain's liability for negligent misrepresentation in preparation and 
delivery of the warranty deeds. See Menuskin. 145 F.3d at 763. 
31. See id. at 759-70. 
32. See id. at 770 (citing REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 164). 
33. See Menuskin. 145 F.3d at 770. 
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negligent misrepresentation c1aims."'34 A similar blending of claims in 
contract and tort was more problematic for the plaintiffs in GBJ Corp. v. 
Eastern Ohio Paving CO.,35 where the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of 
plaintiffs' fraud claim because it did not "have an identity independent from 
a related contract claim. ,,36 Under New York law, explained the court, a fraud 
claim can be maintained with a claim for breach of contract only if the 
fraudulent "promise was 'collateral or extraneous' to the contract."37 
Another interesting aspect of Menuskin is its suggestion that important 
consequences may flow from failure to distinguish carefully a claim based on 
inappropriate behavior during contract formation from one based on a failure 
of contract performance. The distinction between these two claims may be 
important because, under classic contract law, they trigger different remedies. 
A claim based on fraud or misrepresentation during contract formation may 
entitle the claimant to contract recission,38 while a claim based on a failure of 
performance may trigger damages measured by the lost performance.39 As a 
practical matter, this distinction may be measured in dollars. Upon contract 
recission, a claimant may be entitled to restitution of benefits conferred (either 
in kind or as a money judgment) plus incidental or consequential damages 
caused by the misrepresentation.40 In tum, the claimant must make restitution 
of benefits received.41 This recovery upon contract recission may be a small 
sum. Upon proof of breach of an enforceable contract, however, a claimant 
may be entitled to damages measured by lost expectation, i.e., the difference 
between what was promised and what was received.42 
Curiously, the Menuskin purchasers apparently attempted to demonstrate 
misrepresentation, which would have entitled them to recission, and yet 
requested that the defendants be liable on the contract. This blending of 
misrepresentation and breach in Menuskin probably did not much matter, 
given the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that plaintiffs had no contractual 
relationship with the defendants. Having found no contract, neither recission 
nor damages was appropriate. In another case, however, the blurring of 
claims within contract may have significant consequences since an 
unfortunate characterization of a claim may foreclose a preferred remedy. 
34. [d. at 769. 
35. 139 F.3d 1080 (6th Cir. 1998). This case is more fully discussed in the section on 
the statute of frauds. See infra text accompanying notes 52-89. 
36. GBJ Corp .• 139 F.3d at 1087. 
37. [d. at 1088. 
38. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at § 4.15. 
39. See id. at § 12.8. 
40. See id. at § 4.15. 
41. See id. 
42. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at § 12.8. 
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Menuskin may thus send an important message to practitioners. While 
a misrepresentation (of an existing fact) clearly differs from a promise (of 
future action), these two fact patterns sometimes overlap. As a simple 
example, a party may misrepresent that land is unencumbered and also 
promise to convey unencumbered land. If the land ultimately is conveyed 
subject to an encumbrance, a claim stated in terms of misrepresentation may 
result in recission of the sales contract and the possible refund of any deposit. 
A claim stated in terms of a broken promise, however, may produce damages, 
measured by the difference in value between encumbered and unencumbered 
land. The message of Menuskin may therefore be that care should be taken 
in stating a contract claim based on a false representation and promise, as 
much may be gained or lost in this process. 
2. Unconscionability 
In Forsythe v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp.,43 the plaintiff and her 
husband executed a real estate mortgage requiring them to make monthly 
payments of$43 7 .24. This sum included principal, interest, and an additional 
amount to be held in escrow to fund property taxes, special assessments and 
insurance premiums. Unfortunately, the settlement agent at closing 
underestimated the appropriate escrow costs, and this error continued 
undetected for twenty-eight months.44 
A few months after acquiring the Forsythe mortgage, BancBoston 
discovered the shortage and notified the Forsythes that their monthly 
payments would increase by $124.97 for twelve months. The Forsythes 
apparently were unable to pay this additional amount.45 BancBoston refused 
to accept smaller payments and, in June of 1989, commenced foreclosure 
proceedings against the Forsythes. In October 1989, the Forsythes filed for 
bankruptcy and Thomas Forsythe's wages were garnished, partly to pay 
BancBoston. In April of 1990, Thomas Forsythe committed suicide. Six 
months later, BancBoston again instituted a foreclosure action, which Darlene 
Forsythe and BancBoston settled in 1992. As part of this settlement 
agreement, Darlene Forsythe was to pay $8,000 and sign a release agreeing' 
never to institute any action against BancBoston. In return, BancBoston 
deemed the mortgage current and dismissed the foreclosure action without 
prejudice.46 
43. 135 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1997) 
44. See id. at 1072. 
45. See id. at 1072-73. 
46. See id. at 1073. 
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In 1993, Darlene Forsythe filed an action against BancBoston on behalf 
of herself and the estate of her deceased husband, alleging breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, breach of fiduciary duty and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court found that 
Forsythe signed a valid release and granted BancBoston's motion for 
summary judgment against her. The court further granted summary judgment 
against the estate of Thomas Forsythe.47 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Forsythe argued that the settlement 
agreement, which would preclude her recourse against BancBoston, was 
unconscionable, violated public policy, and lacked consideration. The Sixth 
Circuit rejected each of Forsythe's claims. Applying Kentucky law, the court 
described an unconscionable contract as one "no man in his senses, not under 
delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man 
would accept, on the other.,,48 Forsythe, observed the court, was represented 
by counsel in negotiating the settlement agreement, which benefitted her by 
waiving more than $9,000 in past due payments and allowing her to retain her 
house. Since Forsythe's alleged injuries occurred prior to the signing of the 
release, the court declined to address Forsythe's charge that the settlement 
agreement unconscionably barred all future claims. The court then concluded 
that the release did not violate public policy, observing that courts should be 
slow to allow parties to escape their contract obligations on the basis of 
pretextual policy violations.49 
The Sixth Circuit swiftly rejected Forsythe's argument that the settlement 
agreement lacked consideration, finding substantial consideration in 
BancBoston's agreement to allow Forsythe to keep her house. BancBoston' s 
dismissal of its forfeiture action without prejudice supplied further 
consideration under Kentucky authority that consideration may consist of the 
relinquishment of the right to engage in an activity to which one would 
otherwise have been legally entitled.so 
Additionally, the court affirmed summary judgment against Thomas 
Forsythe's estate. BancBoston, reasoned the court, had no duty under the 
mortgage agreement to accept partial payments or to provide a yearly analysis 
ofthe escrow. BancBoston did not breach its implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing; indeed, noted the court, BancBoston was more lenient toward the 
Forsythes than the covenant of good faith and fair dealing required. Finally, 
47. See Forsythe. 135 F.3d at 1073. 
48. Id. at 1074 (quoting Louisville Bear Safety Serv., Inc. v. South Central Bell Tel. 
Co., 571 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1694 (4th 
ed. 1976». 
49. See id. at 1074. 
50. See id. 
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BancBoston did not breach a fiduciary duty to the Forsythes in the court's 
view, since the relationship between a mortgagor and mortgagee is not a 
fiduciary one under Kentucky law.51 
C. Statute of Frauds 
1. Requirements Contracts 
Does the Article 2 statute of frauds bar enforcement of a non-exclusive 
contract for the requirements of a new business? The Sixth Circuit answered 
this question affirmatively in Orchard Group, Inc. v. Konica Med. Corp.,52 by 
far the most interesting statute of frauds case before the court during the 
survey period. The alleged contract provided for Konica' s sale of medical x-
ray film at a forty-five percent discount off list price "in return for [Orchard 
Groups's] film commitment of 36 months."53 This alleged language of 
contract appeared in a letter sent to Orchard Group by a Konica sales 
representative. Three weeks after the date of this letter, Konica informed 
Orchard Group that it would not approve the deal. Unable to find an alternate 
supplier, Orchard Group soon went out of business and sued Konica for 
breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Konica responded that 
Orchard Group's claim was barred by Ohio's Article 2 statute of frauds. 54 The 
district court denied Konica's motion for summary judgment and a jury 
subsequently returned a $1,000,000 verdict for Orchard Group on its breach 
of contract claim.55 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Konica initially argued it was not bound 
by the alleged letter of contract with Orchard Group since the sales 
representative who sent the letter had no authority to bind Konica. Applying 
Ohio law, the court rejected this argument, finding apparent authority in the 
Konica sales representative. 56 
The Sixth Circuit, however, agreed with Konica that Ohio's Article 2 
statute of frauds barred enforcement of the alleged contract. Finding no 
specific ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit undertook the 
51. See Forsythe. 135 F.3d at 1077. 
52. 135 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 1998). 
53. Orchard Group. 135 F.3d at 423. 
54. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.04(A)(Anderson 1992). 
55. See Orchard Group. 135 F.3d at 422. At this point, Konica moved for judgment 
as a matter of law, re-asserting its statute offrauds claim. The district court denied Konica's 
motion, as well as Orchard Group's motion for pre-judgment interest. Both parties appealed 
to the Sixth Circuit. See id. 
56. See Orchard Group. 135 F.3d at 427. 
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task of determining whether Ohio would enforce a contract for the 
requirements of a new business where the contract contained no quantity 
term.57 
The court initially observed that a contract for the sale of goods for $500 
or more generally fails to satisfy the statute of frauds unless there is a writing 
stating the quantity of goods sold. The court noted that Konica' s letter on its 
face contained no quantity term.58 Orchard Group contended however, that 
the agreement was a requirements contract and, therefore, was enforceable 
without a specific quantity term. 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by quoting U.C.C. section 2-306(1), 
which sets forth the standard for a requirements contract: 
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements 
of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, 
except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the 
absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or 
requirements may be tendered or demanded. 59 
Applying this section, the court determined that Konica's letter "fails as a 
requirements contract because [( 1)] it lacks a specific quantity term - estimate 
or -- otherwise and [(2)] there is no prior course of dealing from which a 
quantity term could be implied" since Orchard Group is a new business.60 
The court's statement can be narrowed by coupling it with the courts' 
subsequent conclusion that the arrangement between Konica and Orchard 
Group was not exclusive. This lack of exclusivity, reasoned the court, 
together with the absence of "any identifiable quantity term, or one that may 
be implied from a prior course of dealings," made the contract unenforceable 
as a requirements contract.61 
Although the text ofU.C.C. section 2-306(1) does not expressly require 
exclusivity,62 case law has long recognized this feature as essential to the 
mutuality necessary for an enforceable contract.63 Indeed, the definition of a 
requirements contract typically includes a reference to exclusivity.64 Orchard 
57. See id at 427. 
58. See id. at 428. 
59. Orchard Group, 135 F.3d at 428 (citing Cyril Bath Co. v. Winters Indus. 892 F.2d 
465 (6th Cir. 1989». 
60. [d. at 428. 
61. [d. at 430. 
62. Cf U.C.C. § 2-306(2) which addresses "exclusive" dealings. 
63. See JAMES 1. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-9 
n.3 & accompanying text (4th ed. 1995). 
64. Professor Farnsworth has defined a requirements contract as "one under which the 
seller agrees to sell and the buyer to buy all of the goods of a particular kind that the buyer may 
require in its business." FARNSWORlH, supra note 24, at § 2.15. 
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Group may thus be cited for its holding that a non-exclusive contract for the 
requirements of a new business is unenforceable without a stated estimate. 
Another interesting aspect ofthe Sixth Circuit opinion in Orchard Group 
is the court's conclusion that parol evidence of exclusivity was inadmissible 
to counter the "plain language" ofKonica's letter. In the Sixth Circuit's view, 
nothing in the letter "even remotely suggests exclusivity. ,,65 The court found 
conclusive Orchard Group's ability to order zero units of film without 
committing a breach, which, according to the court "completely foreclosed" 
the possibility of exclusivity.66 Contract drafters thus may be well-advised to 
avoid Orchard Group by expressing in clear terms the exclusivity of a 
requirements arrangement, especially one involving a new business. 
2. Exception for Specially Manufactured Goods 
In Webcor Packaging Corp. v. Autozone, Inc. 67 the Sixth Circuit again 
found an alleged agreement unenforceable under the statute offrauds. In this 
case, Webcor contracted over several years with various vendors to 
manufacture cartons with the Autozone trade name, Duralast. The changing 
group of vendors who bought the Duralast cartons used them to package their 
own automobile parts which they then sold to Autozone as "retail ready" 
items.68 Autozone fostered Webcor's role in this production chain by 
directing vendors to Webcor and by supplying Webcor with artwork and 
specifications for Duralast packaging. Occasionally, Autozone purchased 
cartons from Webcor for its own use.69 
In late 1990, vendor demand for Duralast cartons increased and Webcor' s 
normal thirty-day inventory was depleted. Subsequently, in a telephone 
conversation initiated by a Webcor sales representative, Autozone allegedly 
assured Webcor that if Web cor increased its inventory to a sixty-day supply 
in order to meet vendor demand, Autozone would "cover" payment if the 
cartons became obsolete. In 1993, Autozone decided to change the Duralast 
brand name and symbol, and Webcor's inventory did indeed become obsolete. 
Webcor was unable to sell a portion of its Duralast sixty- day inventory and 
claimed damages from Autozone.70 
Following a one-day bench trial, the district court ruled that Michigan's 
statute of frauds governing sale of goods precluded enforcement of 
65. Orchard Group, 135 F.3d at 429. 
66. See id. 
67. 158 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 1998). 
68. See Webcor Packaging Corp., 158 F.3d at 355. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. 
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Autozone's alleged oral agreement to compensate Web cor for its obsolete 
inventory. The district court found no signed writing to satisfy the statute of 
frauds,71 and further determined that the alleged agreement did not fall within 
the exception for specially-manufactured goods.72 
Upon Webcor's appeal, the Sixth Circuit found a "sound basis" for the 
district court's conclusion that the specially-manufactured goods exception 
was inapplicable. The court noted, however, a "significant wrinkle" presented 
by the "series of three-layered transactions involving multiple parties"73 and 
seized the opportunity "to refine and extend" the lower court's analysis. '4 
The specially-manufactured goods exception to the statute of frauds 
allows enforcement of a contract without a writing: 
if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for 
sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before 
notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate 
that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their 
manufacture or commitments for their procurement. 7S 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis under this section with the traditional 
"look to the goods"76 test. The relevant question under this test, explained the 
court, is whether "the goods themselves have some feature that makes the 
product marketable only to the buyer. ,,77 The focus is thus on the goods 
rather than on the regularity or irregularity of the manufacturing process.78 
The court further noted a circularity in requiring evidence to establish both 
that goods are "specially made for the buyer"79 and that they are "unsuitable 
for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business."so "Specially 
manufactured goods," reasoned the court, are "necessarily goods unsuitable 
for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business."sl 
71. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.2201(1)(West 1994). 
72. See id. at § 440.2201(3)(a). 
73. Webcor Packaging Corp .• 158 F.3d at 357. 
74. Id. at 355. 
75. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 440.2201(3)(a)(West 1994). 
76. Webcor Packaging Corp .• 158 F.3d at 357. 
77. Id. at 357 
78. The focus, explained the court, is not on "[w]hether the goods were made in an 
unusual, as opposed to the regular, business operation or manufacturing process of the seller." 
Id. at 357 (quoting Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 669 
F.2d 1026, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
79. Webcor Packaging Corp .. 158 F.3d at 356. 
80. Id. at 357. 
81. Id. at 357. 
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In Webcor's case, the Sixth Circuit found no easy answer in the 
traditional "look to the goods," approach82 since the buyer's identity was 
unclear. While the cartons themselves displayed Autozone's Duralast logo, 
multiple purchasers had an interest in purchasing them. The court observed 
that a buyer might be identified through either: (I) an "ultimate purchaser" 
theory, urged by Webcor or (2) a "single buyer" theory, adopted by the 
district court. In the district court's view, the specially-manufactured goods 
exception contemplates manufacture for a single buyer and, therefore, did not 
apply to the mUltiple buyers of Dura last cartons. While criticizing the "single 
buyer" theory as "overly rigid in a world of increasingly complex business 
transactions,"83 the Sixth Circuit found the specially-manufactured goods 
exception inapplicable on another ground. 
The Duralast cartons, the Sixth Circuit reasoned, were not specially 
manufacturedJor Autozone, but rather for the multiple vendors who then used 
them to package the parts they sold to Autozone.84 Thus, even if Autozone 
were identified as "the buyer," the relationship between Webcor and Autozone 
was too attenuated to demonstrate that the cartons were produced for 
Autozone. Consequently, Web cor could not claim protection from the statute 
of frauds under the specially-manufactured goods exception and, concluded 
the Sixth Circuit, Webcor's action against Autozone was properly barred.8s 
3. Contracts Jor the Sale oj Securities -- Article 8 
In GBJ Corp. v. Eastern Ohio Paving CO.,86 the district court applied the 
wrong statute of frauds to plaintiffs' contract claims. Plaintiffs' claims were 
indeed barred, according to the Sixth Circuit, but not by the statute of frauds 
governing suretyships, as the district court held. The alleged contract, 
explained the Sixth Circuit, was not a promise to answer for a debt (owed by 
another party), but rather, a bilateral agreement to assume a debt. Because 
this alleged agreement involved an exchange of stock for capital, it fell within 
Article 8, which governs sales of securities. Section 8-319 of New York's 
U .C.C. imposes a writing requirement on such transactions, thus rendering the 
alleged oral contract unenforceable.87 
82. Webcor Packaging Corp .• 158 F.3d at 357. 
83. [d. at 359. 
84. See id. at 360. 
85. See id. at 360. 
86. 139 F.3d 1080 (6th Cir. 1998). 
87. At the time GBJwas decided, U.C.c. § 8-319 provided in part: 
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless (a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
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The precedential effect of GBJ is limited, since the Article 8 statute of 
frauds which snagged the plaintiff there, was replaced by the New York 
legislature in October of 1997.88 The current version, relocated at U.C.C. 
section 8-113, follows the uniform revision to Article 8 in making the statute 
of frauds generally inapplicable to contracts for the sale of securities. 89 The 
New York enactment, however, departs from the uniform version in imposing 
a writing requirement for certain contracts for the sale of securities involving 
real property.90 
sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that a contract has 
been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated 
price. 
NY. U.C.C. § 8-319 (conso!. 1981). 
88. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-113 (McKinney 1997). 
89. The Official Comment to the revised Uniform Act explains: 
This section provides that the statute offrauds does not apply to contracts for the sale 
of securities, reversing prior law which had a special statute of frauds in Section 8-
319 (1978). With the increasing use of electronic means of communication, the 
statute offrauds is unsuited to the realities of the securities business. For securities 
transactions, whatever benefits a statute offrauds may play in filtering out fraudulent 
claims are outweighed by the obstacles it places in the development of modem 
commercial practices in the securities business. 
N.Y.U.C.C. § 8-113. 
Id. 
90. See id. N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-113 provides: 
Statute of Frauds Generally Inapplicable 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) a contract or modification of a contract for 
the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable whether or not there is a writing 
signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even 
if the contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year of its 
making. 
(b) A contract for the sale of a security constituting an ownership interest or a 
proprietary lease or either ofthe foregoing from a corporation or partnership formed 
for the purpose of cooperative ownership of real property is not enforceable by way 
of action or defense unless: 
(I) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought which describes the security and states its price; or 
(2) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in its pleading, 
testimony, or otherwise in court that a contract was made for the sale of the 
security and the admission describes the security and states its price. 
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II. INTERPRETING THE AGREEMENT: WHAT IS ... 
Like Judge Friendly, who mused, "The issue is, what is chicken?"91 the 
Sixth Circuit was asked in several cases to interpret contract language. In 
several of these surveyed cases, the Sixth Circuit found the disputed terms had 
a plain meaning, which sometimes precluded admission of parol evidence to 
establish a different meaning.92 
A. What is "Existed"? 
In Equitable Life Assurance Soc yo/the United States v. Poe,93 the Sixth 
Circuit was asked to interpret an incontestability clause placed in an insurance 
contract pursuantto Michigan statute.94 In pertinent part, the clause provided: 
"[n]o claim for Loss incurred or Disability that starts after two years from the 
Effective Date will be reduced or denied on the grounds that a sickness or 
physical condition existed prior to the Effective Date. ,,95 
Equitable Life urged the court to interpret the word existed in the above 
clause to include only conditions that were not yet manifested. Under such 
an interpretation, Equitable Life could properly deny a claim based on a 
condition manifested prior to the effective date of the policy. Finding no 
interpretation of this clause by the Michigan Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit 
determined that Michigan would join the "growing minority of courts" that 
have rejected the "first manifest" doctrine urged by Equitable Life.96 
The contract language, observed the Sixth Circuit, had a plain meaning. 
Nothing in the clause, noted the court, "suggest[s] that the term 'existed' 
should be read in any way except in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense."97 
A manifested condition, reasoned the court, also exists.98 The court further 
noted that if there were any ambiguity in the term existed, it would be 
resolved in favor of the insured.99 
91. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. InCI Sales Corp, 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960). 
92. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at § 7.12. 
93. 143 F.3d 1013 (6th Cir. 1998). 
94. See MICH. COMPo ANN. § 500.3408 (West 1993). 
95. Equitable Life Assurance Soc 'y, 143 F.3d at 1017 (emphasis supplied). 
96. ld. at 1018 (citing Oglesby v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 770, 776 (D. 
Del. 1995). 
97. ld. 
98. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
99. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc 'y, 143 F.3d at 1018. 
HeinOnline -- 1999 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 250 1999
250 Law Review [2:235 
Finally, the court found contextual support for its interpretation in an 
earlier section of the insurance policy (also mandated by Michigan law) which 
specifically mentioned fraudulent misstatements. Because this reference to 
fraud was not repeated in the incontestibilty clause, the court discerned a 
legislative intent that the clause would protect even already-manifested 
conditions. Thus, concluding that the word exists includes both manifested 
and unmanifested conditions, the court affirmed the district court's holding 
that the incontestability clause barred Equitable Life from denying coverage 
of the insured's disability as a preexisting condition. 100 
B. What is "Exclusive Right to Operate"? 
In Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,IOI several 
Michigan Indian tribes claimed the 1996 passage of the Michigan Gaming 
Control and Revenue Act (the "Act") released them from their obligation to 
pay the state a percentage of the net win from their electronic casino games. 
The Tribes' payment obligation stemmed from a 1993 consent judgment, 
which conditioned the Tribes' obligation on their "exclusive right to 
operate"J02 electronic games of chance in Michigan. The Tribes argued that 
these exclusive rights terminated when the Act empowered the Michigan 
Gaming Control Board to grant licenses for casinos in Detroit. When several 
of the Tribes notified the State they would make no further payments, 
Governor Engler filed a motion to compel compliance. The district court 
concluded that the Tribes retained the exclusive right to operate casinos and 
therefore must continue to share their winnings with the state. One Tribe 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 103 
The Sixth Circuit adopted a posture of "deferential de novo" review 
toward the district court's interpretation of its own consent judgment. 104 
"[F]ew persons," reasoned the Sixth Circuit, "are in a better position to 
understand the meaning of a consent decree than the district judge who 
oversaw and approved it."105 Not surprisingly, the court ultimately affirmed 
the district court's conclusion that the Tribes' exclusivity continues until a 
non-Tribal entity receives a casino license. 106 
100. See id. at 1020. 
101. 146 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1998). 
102. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 146 F.3d at 372. 
103. See id. at 371. 
104. Id. at 371. 
105. Id.at 372 (quoting Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551,558 n.12 (6th Cir. 1981). 
106. See Saul Ste. Marie Tribe, 146 F.3d at 372. 
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Observing a plain meaning in the words "exclusive right to operate,"I07 
the Sixth Circuit further affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence 
offered to support the Tribes' interpretation. The Tribes' claim of ambiguity, 
observed the court, does not in itself create ambiguity. Moreover, the court 
found the Tribes' proffered evidence irrelevant to the interpretation issue 
since it did not relate to formation of the contract, but rather consisted of post-
hoc contract interpretations. 108 
C. What is "Auftragsverhaltnis"? 
The Sixth Circuit was asked in Tschira v. Willingham lO9 to interpret a 
contract between a U.S. seller and foreign buyers. The term at issue, 
"auftragsverhaltnis," was central to the plaintiff-buyers' claim that the parties 
stood in a fiduciary relationship. Under German law, invoked under a choice-
of-law clause, the buyers claimed use of the term "auftragsverhaltnis" created 
a "mandate relationship," which is similar to an agency relationship under 
U.S. law, with consequent fiduciary obligations yo The sellers, on the other 
hand, claimed the use of the term "auftragsverhaltnis" created only a 
"contractual relationship." III The district court interpreted 
"auftragsverhaltnis" to impose fiduciary duties, and after a verdict for the 
buyers, the sellers appealed. 112 
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the parties intended 
to create a fiduciary relationship. Key to the court's conclusion was a 
provision in the contract recognizing a power of attorney in the seller. Such 
a right, reasoned the court, evidenced the parties' intent to create a mandate 
relationship. 
Finding ample evidence of intent in the power-of-attorney provision, the 
Sixth Circuit did not directly respond to the seller's interesting argument that 
he should be held to the ordinary rather than the legal meaning of "auftrag." 
Although "auftragsverhaltnis" means "mandate" under the German Civil 
Code, it has various meanings in the German language. The seller had argued 
that "auftrag" should be given its "ordinary" rather than its "legal" meaning 
since, as an "ordinary businessman," he would not have used the term in its 
107. Id. at 373. 
108. See id. 
109. 135 F.3d 1077 (6th Cir. 1998). The facts of Tschira are presented in more detail 
in the section on intention to be bound. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
110. See Tschira. 135 F.3d at 1081. 
Ill. See id. 
112. See id. at 1082. 
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legal sense.1I3 The court thus noted without resolving the issue of whether a 
contracting party unfamiliar with legal usage should be held to the legal 
meaning of a contract term. 
D. What is "Commitment"? 
In another invocation of the plain meaning rule, the Sixth Circuit held 
parol evidence inadmissible "to counter the force of plain language."114 In 
Orchard Group,115 a supplier of x-ray film raised the statute of frauds as a 
defense against an alleged buyer. The buyer's ability to satisfy the statute of 
frauds depended upon proof that a requirements contract was exclusive. To 
establish this exclusivity, the buyer sought to introduce evidence to establish 
that use of the term "commitment" in a letter of contract created an exclusive 
relationship.1I6 In holding such evidence inadmissible, the Sixth Circuit 
observed that the language "is not unclear; it simply does not suggest, even 
impliedly, an exclusive relationship."117 To permit parol evidence in such a 
case, added the court, would allow "post-litigation revision of a contract 
which is not the least unclear."118 
E. What is "Any Questions"? "All Controversies and Claims"? 
In Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Industries Inc., 119 the Sixth Circuit was asked 
to determine the reach and interplay of a choice-of-Iaw clause and an 
arbitration clause in the parties' requirements contract. Under the terms of the 
contract, Garrison agreed to manufacture for Ferro a flame-retardant additive 
known as PyroCheck LM. The contract, which specified a quantity range and 
a two-year initial term, contained a standard arbitration clause and an Ohio 
choice-of-Iaw clause. After several months in which Garrison produced 
insufficient quantities ofPyroCheck LM, sometimes of inferior quality, Ferro 
sent Garrison a contract termination letter. When Ferro subsequently refused 
to pay for approximately 2.2 million pounds of PyroCheck LM, Garrison 
invoked the arbitration clause. Before arbitration commenced, however, Ferro 
filed an action in state court charging Garrison with fraudulent inducement 
113. See Tschira. 135 F.3d at 1084. 
114. Orchard Group, Inc. v. Konica Med. Corp., 135 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 1998). 
115. See Orchard Group. 135 F.3d at 429. Orchard Group is more fully discussed in 
the section on the statute of frauds. See supra text accompanying notes 52-89. 
116. See id. at 429. 
117. /d. at 429-30. 
118. /d. at 430. 
119. 142 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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and seeking to enjoin arbitration and rescind the contract. 120 Garrison then 
removed the action to the Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio and asked that court to refer the complaint to arbitration. 121 
After a "whirlwind" of procedural maneuvers, and partially parallel 
hearings before both the district court and an arbitration panel, the district 
court determined that Garrison had, indeed, fraudulently induced Ferro to 
enter the agreement and ordered the contract rescinded to the extent not 
performed. 122 Subsequently, the arbitration panel found Ferro liable to 
Garrison for damages exceeding $1.6 million. The district court then vacated 
the arbitration award. 123 
The key issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether Ferro's allegations 
of fraudulent inducement were arbitrable. Under the choice-of-Iaw clause, the 
parties agreed that "all of the provisions of this Agreement and any questions 
concerning its interpretation and enforcement shall be governed by the laws 
of the State of Ohio, USA exclusive of its choice oflaw rules .... " 124 The 
contract also provided for arbitration of" [ a] II controversies and claims arising 
out of or relating to this agreement." 125 
The district court determined that under the terms of the contract, the 
fraudulent inducement issue was not arbitrable. The district court reasoned 
that Ohio law, applicable under the parties' choice-of-Iaw clause, required 
judicial resolution of a charge of fraudulent inducement. 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court, reasoning that the 
choice-of-Iaw clause did not preclude application of federal arbitration law, 
under which the fraud claim was arbitrable. The Circuit Court explained that 
if the parties' arbitration clause were subject to the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA),126 as an agreement involving interstate commerce, an issue of 
fraudulent inducement of the entire contract would be resolved through 
arbitration, but an issue of fraudulent inducement of the arbitration clause 
would be for judicial adjudication. Therefore, unless the parties opted out of 
this interpretation of the FAA, the issue offraudulent inducement should have 
been resolved through arbitration. 127 
120. [d. at 928. Ferro contended that Garrison falsely represented that: (1) it was capable 
of manufacturing the minimum quantities of PyroCheck LM, and (2) it sustained only minor 
damage from a tornado. [d. at 929. 
121. See id. at 928-29. 
122. See id. at 928. The district court determined that Ferro was not entitled to return 
of the $250,000 it paid Garrison upon execution of the contract. See id. at 930. 
123. See Ferro Corp. 142F.3dat931. 
124. [d. at 931-32, n.7 (emphasis added). 
125. [d. at 931. 
126. See 29 U.S.c. § 2 (1994). 
127. See Ferro Corp. 142 F.3d at 933. 
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The Sixth Circuit rejected Ferro's argumentthatthe parties' Ohio choice-
of-law provision was intended to avoid federal arbitration law. Mindful of the 
teaching that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration," 128 the Sixth Circuit found no indication that 
the parties intended that Ohio law would determine whether fraud should be 
judicially adjudicated. The court noted the conspicuously broad language of 
the arbitration clause, which applied to "[ aJII controversies and claims arising 
out of or relating to this Agreement ... ."129 If Ferro had intended to limit 
issues subject to arbitration, reasoned the court, it could have expressly so 
provided in the contract. 130 
As a matter of policy and common sense, added the Sixth Circuit, 
interpreting the parties' contract to require judicial adjudication of claims of 
fraudulent inducement would allow a party to avoid arbitration simply by 
pleading fraudulent inducement, thus vitiating "the primary benefit of 
arbitration, i.e., the expeditious, inexpensive resolution of disputes."131 
Moreover, the court noted that since most contracts contain a choice-of-Iaw 
clause, interpreting these clauses to avoid federal arbitration law would leave 
the FAA applicable in only a very small number of cases. "Arbitration," 
concluded the court, "is a creature of contract, and parties should, absent the 
most extenuating and explicit of circumstances, be required to arbitrate those 
disputes which they agree to arbitrate."132 
F. What is Indemnification for "All Loss"? 
Can a contracting party recover for its own negligence and for its 
violation of environmental statutes under the terms of an indemnity 
agreement? These were the issues before the court in Olin Corp. v. Yeargin 
Inc.,133 where the Sixth Circuit was again asked to interpret the meaning of 
disputed contract language. Olin had contracted with Yeargin to perform 
specified on-site construction and maintenance tasks in Olin's chlorine 
production facility. While Yeargin employees were replacing a dilute caustic 
header pipe, toxic material escaped, contaminating the clothes and skin of 
128. Ferro Corp., 142 F.3d at 932 (quoting Moses H. Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25 (1983». 
129. Id. at 931 (emphasis added). The arbitration agreement at issue provided, "All 
controversies and claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach of this 
Agreement, shall be settled by arbitration in Cleveland, Ohio, in accordance with Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association." Id. (emphasis added). 
130. See id. at 938. 
131. Id. at 938. 
132. Ferro Corp., 142 F.3d at 939. 
133. 146 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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Yeargin employees and producing toxic vapors which they inhaled. After 
failing to decontaminate before leaving Olin's premises, these employees 
subsequently contaminated their motor vehicles and homes and exposed their 
spouses to the toxins. These Yeargin employees and their spouses brought 
actions against Olin, seeking recovery under various theories, including 
negligence and misrepresentation. These actions were ultimately settled. In 
addition to amounts paid under these settlement agreements, Olin paid various 
fines, attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with three complaints 
relating to its violation of environmental statutes. 134 
Olin subsequently sought indemnity from Yeargin under the following 
contract provision: 
(a) Contractor agrees to protect, indemnify and hold Owner harmless from any and 
all loss, damage, liability, claims, demands, costs, or suits of any nature whatsoever 
asserted by employees of Contractor or any third persons (including employees of 
Owner) for property damage, personal injury or death, or otherwise in each case 
arising out of, in connection with or incidental to Work performed under this 
Contract. 
(b) This indemnity shall apply to the extent that said loss, damage, liability, claims, 
demands, costs, or suits are occasioned, brought about or caused, in whole or in part, 
by negligence of Contractor, its agent, directors, officers, employees or servants and 
regardless of whether such negligence be active or passive, primary or secondary. 13' 
Yeargin argued that subsection (b) required it to indemnify Olin only as to 
costs incurred as a result of Yeargin's fault and, thus, did not require it to 
indemnify Olin for Olin's own negligence. The district court agreed, noting 
that Tennessee law requires a clear and unequivocal intent to indemnify the 
indemnitee's own negligence. 136 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district 
court's conclusion, observing no express reference in the contract to Yeargin's 
responsibilities for losses caused by Olin's own negligence. If the parties 
intend this result, added the Sixth Circuit, "it would only take a few seconds 
for the attorneys ... to use appropriate express language such as 'including 
indemnitees' acts of negligence." 137 
134. See Olin, 146 F.3d at 402. These statutes were the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-3-101-50-3-919 (1998); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7479 (1994); the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. §§ 
61.01-.19,61.50-.56 (1998); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9615 (1994). 
135. Olin Corp .. 146 F.3d at 403. 
136. See id. at 404. 
137. Id. (quoting Wajtasiak v. Morgan County, 633 S. W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1982». 
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The Sixth Circuit determined, however, that Olin was entitled to 
indemnification for costs stemming from its violation of environmental 
statutes, reversing the district court on this point. The Sixth Circuit noted the 
general rule that broad language in an indemnity agreement indicating an 
intent to include all liabilities includes environmental liabilities even without 
specific reference. However, an indemnity agreement that is not broadly 
stated, but rather limits liability to specific types of claims, will not include 
environmental liability absent a clear and unambiguous reference. While the 
language in the OlinIY eargin indemnification clause did not specifically refer 
to environmental liabilities, it was broad enough to encompass them. The 
costs, fines and penalties Olin incurred, reasoned the court, arose because 
toxic material caused property damage and personal injury. They thus fell 
within the broad language of subsection (a) and supported Olin's claim for 
indemnification. One judge dissented on this issue, reasoning that "property 
damage, personal injury, or death" listed in subsection (a) all refer to tort 
claims and thus, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, only other tort claims 
(and not claims for violation of environmental statutes) were subject to 
indemnification. 138 
III. NONPERFORMANCE - - "FIRST SUBSTANTIAL BREACH" 
The dispute in Chrysler Int'l Corp. v. Cherokee Export Co. /39 involved 
an export sales agreement under which Cherokee obtained the nonexclusive 
right to buy vehicles from Chrysler for export to customers in listed countries. 
This agreement, formalized in 1989 and renewed in 1993, barred Cherokee 
from selling vehicles to customers in non-listed countries, including the U.S. 
Additionally, Cherokee was specifically barred from selling vehicles to any 
customer for resale. Chrysler's stated goal was to establish a "foothold" in the 
listed countries, and eventually, a worldwide network of distributors. Once 
dealerships were established in a foreign market, Chrysler, upon thirty days 
notice, would remove that country from Cherokee's list of approved 
markets. 140 
During the course of its relationship with Chrysler, Cherokee made 
numerous sales in unlisted areas, in violation of the parties' agreement, 
sometimes creating "strawman" documentation to hide its misdeeds. Upon 
learning of these sales, Chrysler claimed to have expressed concern to 
Cherokee, which Cherokee characterized as "a slap on the wrist." 141 
138. Id. at 409 (Contie, J., dissenting). 
139. 134 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 1998). 
140. See id. at 740-41. 
141. Chrysler. 134 F.3d at 741. 
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The principal disagreement between the parties arose in connection with 
a 1992 contract between Chrysler, Cherokee, and Beijing Jeep Corporation 
(BJC). This contract provided for Chrysler's purchase of 150 BJC-produced 
Jeeps, to be delivered in two shipments to Cherokee in Tanzania, Africa. 
Cherokee claimed both shipments were defective. According to Cherokee, the 
final shipment in July of 1994 was so defective that twenty of the 100 vehicles 
received had to be "cannibalized" for parts to render the remaining vehicles 
saleable. 
By October of 1994, Chrysler had become concerned about the extent of 
Cherokee's exposure, which exceeded 5.5 million in accounts payable to 
Chrysler. Consequently, Chrysler asked Cherokee to double its $750,000 
letter of credit, due to expire in February of 1995.142 Cherokee characterized 
Chrysler's demand as a unilateral decision to terminate the parties' agreement 
with Cherokee without the required notice by placing Cherokee on "finance 
hold,"143 which caused Cherokee to breach agreements with its customers. In 
February of 1995, when Cherokee still owed Chrysler over $3 Ihillion, 
Chrysler drew on the $750,000 letter of credit and, in March, sued Cherokee 
for breach of contract. 144 
Chrysler and Cherokee both claimed the other breached the 1993 renewal 
agreement. Chrysler claimed Cherokee sold in unapproved areas and to 
resellers and failed to pay for the BJC vehicles. Cherokee, in turn, claimed 
Chrysler improperly terminated its relationship with Cherokee, and breached 
its agreement by declining Cherokee's post-1994 orders and rejecting 
Cherokee's warranty claims. The district court granted summary judgment 
for Chrysler. 145 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Noting that both parties may have 
been in breach, the court found "no question" that Cherokee committed the 
first substantial breach through its many out-of-area sales. 146 Michigan law, 
stated the court, is well-settled: "He who commits the first substantial breach 
of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party for 
failure to perform."147 A breach is substantial, observed the court, where it has 
"effected such a change in essential operative elements -of the contract that 
142. See id. The district court so found, although the parties apparently disputed this 
fact. See id. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 742. 
145. See Chrysler, 134 F.3d at 740. 
146. See id. at 743. 
147. Id. at 742 (quoting Ehlinger v. Bodi Lake Lumber Co., 324 Mich. 77, 36 N.W.2d 
311, 316 (Mich. 1949) (quoting Jones v. Berkey, 181 Mich. 472, 148 N.W. 375, 378 (Mich. 
1914»). 
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further performance by the other party is thereby rendered ineffective or 
impossible .... " 148 
The essential purpose of the Chrysler/Cherokee contract, observed the 
Sixth Circuit, was to establish Chrysler's foothold in new markets. Cherokee 
was therefore specifically barred from selling to out-of-area markets because 
Chrysler wanted to reserve those markets for Chrysler dealerships. Although 
Cherokee was aware of Chrysler's essential purpose, it made numerous sales 
to unapproved markets, disguising some such sales through "bogus 
paperwork. "149 Under these circumstances, concluded the court, Cherokee 
committed a material breach as a matter oflaw, and was thus precluded from 
asserting rights under its contract with Chrysler. ISO 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISES. 
A. Damages 
Basic hornbook law teaches that contract damages generally are 
measured by an injured party's lost expectation, i.e., by the difference 
between what was promised and what was actually received. lSI Such a 
traditional measure of damages would have made a defaulting commercial 
tenant liable for over $900,000 in damages in Highland Superstores, Inc. v. 
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Highland Superstores, Inc. v. Strobeck Real 
Estate, Inc.152 This was not good news to Highland's unsecured creditors who 
were competing with the landlord for Highland's assets upon its Chapter 11 
petition. Consequently, the Unsecured Creditors' Committee fashioned "an 
elegant and creative," though ultimately unsuccessful, argument that would 
have reduced the landlord's damages to zero.1S3 
The landlord's damages were based primarily on the difference between 
payments due under the remaining (approximately) fourteen years of 
Highland's lease and payments due under a new lease negotiated by the 
landlord upon Highland's default. The Committee urged the bankruptcy court 
148. Chrsyler. 134 F.3d. at 742 (quoting McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 372 Mich. 
567, 127 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Mich. 1964». 
149. See id. at 743. 
150. See id. 
151. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, at §12.9 (loss in value is measured by the 
"difference between the value to the injured party of the performance that should have been 
received and the value to that party of what, if anything, actually was received ... "). As 
Professor Farnsworth explains, this loss in value may be qualified by considerations of other 
loss, cost avoid and loss avoided. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 347 (1981). 
152. 154 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 1998) 
153. Highland Superstores. 154 F.3d at 581. 
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to base its calculation of this differential in lease revenues on the discounted 
present value of the stream of future payments, and to use discount rates that 
reflected the relative creditworthiness ofthe two tenants. If creditworthiness 
were thus considered, the value of the new lease would exceed the value of the 
Highland lease, given Highland's "C" credit rating and the new lessee's "A" 
credit rating. Thus, according to the Committee, the landlord's position 
actually improved, making damages inappropriate. ls4 
The bankruptcy court rejected the Committee's argument, basing its 
calculation of damages on the lease terms and Illinois contract law. On 
appeal, the district court reversed. While acknowledging the "utter lack" of 
precedent for the Committee's calculation, the district court adopted the 
Committee's methodology to "see whether the law does develop in the 
[Committee's] direction ... .'IlSS 
The Sixth Circuit declined the district court's invitation "to tum a blind 
eye toward fundamental principles of contract law."ls6 The ability of a 
breaching party to pay, explained the court, does not affect the calculation of 
damages. If collectibility were a factor in measuring damages, a destitute 
promisor would owe very little in damages, because of the high nonpayment 
risk, while a creditworthy promisor would owe much more. The Sixth Circuit 
thus declined "to jettison well-established principles of state contract law in 
favor of the creative, yet radical, approach advanced by the Committee." IS7 
B. Statute of Limitations 
Largely a conflicts case, Cole v. Miletj/58 sends an important message to 
those drafting choice-of-Iaw clauses. The transaction at issue began in 1983, 
when Mileti co-produced a motion picture in which Cole invested $475,000. 
Cole's investment in the corporation, organized to purchase and distribute this 
film, was funded through a bank loan. Unfortunately for the parties, the film 
failed. Soon thereafter, in 1984, Mileti and Cole entered an agreement 
requiring Cole to transfer his stock and indebtedness to Mileti, in exchange for 
Mileti's promise to repay Cole's investment 10an.159 The written agreement 
154. See id. at 580. 
155. /d. at 576. 
156. ld. at 579-80. 
157. Highland Superstore. 154 F.3d at 580. 
158. 133 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998). 
159. See Cole. 133 F.3d at 435. It is not clear why the court refers to this agreement as 
a suretyship, as the facts seem to describe an indemnification. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 
24, at § 6.3 ("In a contract of indemnity, the promise runs to an obligor or a prospective obligor 
rather than to an obligee, as is typically the case in a contract of suretyship. ") ld. 
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between Cole and Mileti contained a clause specifying that their "contract 
would "be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
California." 160 Mileti failed to repay Cole's loan as promised, prompting Cole 
to make sporadic payments until 1992, when the bank sued Cole to recover 
the balance due. Cole settled with the bank for $310,000 and in 1994, nine 
years after Mileti's alleged breach, sued Mileti for breach of the 1984 
contract. The district court for the northern district of Ohio denied Mileti's 
motion to dismiss and a U.S. Magistrate ultimately granted summary 
judgment to Cole. 161 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Mileti challenged both the Magistrate's 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him and the Magistrate's determination 
that Cole's action was not time-barred. Mileti argued that the Magistrate 
improperly applied Ohio's fifteen-year statute of limitations rather than 
California's four-year statute. 
In affirming the Magistrate, the Sixth Circuit initially noted the familiar 
rule that federal courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-Iaw rules of the 
forum state. Ohio law, observed the court, requires Ohio courts to apply 
Ohio's statue of limitations to breach of contract actions brought in Ohio. The 
court rejected Mileti's argument that Ohio common law preserved a long-
repealed Ohio borrowing statute, which would have required application of 
a foreign state's shorter statute of limitations. 
The importance of Cole from a contract perspective is the Sixth Circuit's 
answer to Mileti's final charge that the parties' California choice-of-Iaw 
clause triggered California's statute of limitations. In rejecting Mileti's 
argument, the Sixth Circuit explained that "contractual choice-of-Iaw clauses 
incorporate only substantive law, not procedural provisions such as statutes 
of limitations." 162 The message for contract drafters? An express statement 
that another state's statute of limitations will apply, observed the court, will 
change the Cole result. 
160. Cole, 133 F.3d at 435. 
161. Upon Cole's death in 1995, his wife was substituted as plaintiff. See Cole, 133 
F.3d at 433. 
162. Cole, 133 F.3d at437 (citing Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 1994) 
andCharash v. Oberlin College, 14 F.3d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 1994». 
